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Abstract
Whilst its promoters believe that there are numerous benefits to be gained
by many producers from ethical trade, some stakeholders in the South see
ethical trade schemes as protectionist.  Current wisdom is that if a scheme
is voluntary and is open to all it does not contravene the rules of the World
Trade Organisation.  However this has not been tested in the WTO itself
and there is considerable debate within its committees and other forums
including the committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and the
Committee on Trade and Environment.  This paper, which is part of
ongoing work to understand the external factors that might alter the
impact of ethical trade, explores those factors pushing the development of
ethical trade and also the potential constraints.  Finally the implications
for current ethical trading schemes will be considered.  Reference will be
made to initiatives in the forest sector including forest certification and
ethical markets for non-timber forest products, which is particularly
topical as forest sector liberalisation is amongst the proposed agenda
items for the WTO negotiations in Seattle.
                                                






 This paper originates from a piece of desk research being undertaken as
part of an NRET project on ethical trade and forest dependent people.  It
results from a concern to understand policy factors that may affect ethical
trade initiatives and the focus here is the potential impact of international
trade policy, particularly in the context of the World Trade Organisation
and the new round of trade negotiations to be launched at the Ministerial
Meeting in Seattle (30 November to 3 December 1999).2  The
interpretation of international trade rules, governed by the WTO and
negotiations on liberalisation may in the near future significantly affect
the context in which ethical trade schemes operate.
 
In the forest sector two types of ethical trade are in operation.  One is
forest certification and the second is the variety of fair trade schemes
focusing on products derived from nuts, honey or other non-timber forest
products (NTFPs).  Certification of NTFPs is also being considered.  Ways
in which labour standards might be improved in the forest sector are also
being debated.  The ethical trade schemes that are the focus of this paper
are  forest certification schemes, in particular the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC)and ISO 14001.
Whilst they share many principles with regards to forest management
they have two main differences in terms of how they are implemented and
their methodologies.  The ISO system relies on quasi-governmental bodies
and has strong industry representation, whereas the FSC has greater non-
governmental involvement and new bodies have emerged.  ISO 14001 is a
management system, whereas FSC sets out actual standards for
achievement.
The ISO 14001 environmental management system originates from the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  It aims to develop
uniform forest management systems and standards that companies or
forest managers world wide can adopt voluntarily, and be certified against
by certifiers recognised by existing national standards bodies. Forests and
products evaluated under this system are awarded an ISO-endorsed label.
FSC has developed globally recognised principles for forest management
that are designed to ensure that forests are managed in ways that are
environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable.
Regional, national or other geographic entitites, such as Smartwood and
Woodmark, are accredited by FSC and use these principles as a basis for
developing locally appropriate performance standards against which
                                                
 2 A Watching Brief on the Policy Environment for Ethical Trade will shortly appear on the Natural
Resources and Ethical Trade Web site: http://www.nri.org/NRET/nret.htm.  The first edition will focus
on issues raised by the new WTO Round to be launched in Seattle with later editions looking at issues




managed forests and wood products are assessed.  Forests and products
that meet the standards are awarded a label with the FSC logo.
Assessment focuses on mechanisms required for high quality forest
management rather than trying to measure the social or environmental
impact of management in a particular forest area.
FSC certification and the ISO 14001 system are often presented as
alternatives, with industry favouring the latter. However they are more
properly regarded as complementary in that ISO14001 provides a
framework for better environmental management systems, and the FSC
offers the potential for independent third party certification that certain
standards have been met.
National and local certification agencies are now emerging and are
beginning to implement the standards set by the ISO and FSC within a
national context; for example Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia, LEI and in
Imaflora in Brazil.
Structure of paper xxx
The WTO debate
 
 There has been considerable debate in the committees of the WTO over
the past few years about the trade impacts of eco-labelling schemes,
particularly in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (CTBT) and
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).  Forest certification
schemes such as FSC have been a key element of this debate.  More
recently, environmentalists and forest specialist have been concerned by
moves by APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation)3 to introduce
liberalisation measures in the forest sector to the agenda for discussion in
the new trade round that will begin at the Seattle meeting.  Alarms bells
are being raised that this will lead to deforestation.
 
 The liberalisation debate, and its relationship to the environment, has
repercussions for ethical trade schemes in the forest sector as forest
certification is based on the concept of sustainable forest management.
However, the focus of this paper will be on the more technical issues of the
GATT-legality of ethical trade schemes based on eco-labels or distinctions
in the way in which goods are produced.
 
 Key issues raised within WTO committees have been the trade effects of
eco-labelling schemes.  This debate has proved to be contentious because,
                                                
 3 The APEC countries include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, United States, Vietnam, with ASEAN (Association of South East





as with many trade and environment issues, it has divided nations largely
on a north-south basis.  Moreover, as many eco-labelling schemes are run
by the private sector and are voluntary, it raises the issue of the scope of
international trade rules.  To a large extent, these rules operate at the
level of nation states and the public sector, not private companies or non-
governmental organisations.  Two important topics of debate have been
whether or not eco-labelling schemes break some of the WTO’s rules and
particularly whether they create trade impediments.  Some WTO
members are pushing for clarification on these issues, others want the
WTO’s scope to be formally extended to cover eco-labels whilst others do
not believe this is a matter for the WTO to decide at all.
 
 Other WTO-related issues that might affect ethical trade schemes are
competition policy and the relationship between trade rules and labour
standards.  Certain ethical trade schemes include social as well as
environmental criteria.  Indeed the FSC has several social principals
(Principle #2: Tenure And Use Rights And Responsibilities, Principle #3:
Indigenous Peoples' Rights, Principle #4: Community Relations And
Worker's Rights) and a motion was passed at the 1999 General Assembly
to strengthen labour rights within FSC, through the inclusion of
International Labour Organisation core labour rights.
 
 Linking social criteria to trade rules has proved even more contentious in
international trade negotiations.  States have presented sovereignty
arguments against the insertion of social clauses in trade agreements and
orthodox economists have argued that social standards, such as cheap
labour, form part of a country’s comparative advantage.  Labour issues,
specifically core labour standards were discussed at the WTO Singapore
Ministerial Meeting in December 1996 and the consensus from this and
subsequent meetings has been to refer labour issues in particular to the
ILO as the competent body in this field.  There has been a commitment to
greater formal communication between the WTO and the ILO
 
 The European Union and some eastern Europen countries, Canada,
Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland are keen to include
competition policy in the agenda for Seattle.  In the EU new competition
laws will restrict companies’ ability to impose conditions on suppliers and
each other.  This has implications for forest certification schemes in
particular as one of the main mechanisms for promoting the Forest
Stewardship Council has been through the creation of buyers’ groups in
consuming countries, e.g. the UK, Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.
However, despite the participation of some well-known companies
particularly in the retail sector, only in Belgium does the buyers’ group





Eco-labels and forest certification
 
Eco-labels have evolved as an important policy instrument for
governments and a useful marketing tool for companies wishing to
promote goods with positive environmental attributes to green consumers.
Caldwell describes them as ‘a policy instrument selected by an issuing
entity that attempts to communicate and promote distinctions in similar
products based on the relative impact of a production the environment’
(1996).  They are usually awarded following an assessment of the
environmental effects of a product using life cycle analysis.  LCA takes
many forms, but the basic idea is to conduct an assessment of
environmental impacts associated with the production and consumption.
Forest certification differs from the eco-labels in that it does not always
result in the award of a label.  It is the site that is assessed, not the
product.  If goods are to bear a label chain of custody assessment is also
required.  Second, forest certification is a single-issue assessment
concerned with the management of the forest resource. The most
comprehensive forms of eco-labelling take into account many issues from
production, to processing to consumption and ultimate disposal of the
product (Bourke and Leitch, 1998).  However, the similarities between eco-
labelling and forest certification in terms of potential trade effects and
their status in trade law means that the literature on eco-labels covers
many of the trade arguments related to forest certification.
Eco-labels and Protectionism
The promoters of ethical trade schemes believe that there are numerous
benefits to be gained by producers from ethical trade, but some
stakeholders in the South see eco-labelling schemes ethical trade schemes
as protectionist.  More frequently, allegations of ‘green protectionism’ are
to do with the government actions to ban the import of certain goods
deemed environmentally unfriendly, e.g. Mexico’s complaint against the
US ban on tuna caught in nets that trap dolphins (see Trade database
article or Bridges).  The Dispute Panel ruled that the import ban on tuna
that was not considered ‘dolphin-safe was contrary to WTO regulations
but that voluntary labelling was allowed.  However, voluntary schemes
that label goods according to environmental criteria may also create
barriers to trade, or more precisely impediments to trade.  (Bourke and
Leitch [1998] distinguish between state-implemented non-tariif barriers
which have the explicit aim of protecting the domestic market and the
impediments to trade that may be a by-product of eco-labelling schemes).
The allegations of protectionism are related to:




trade initiatives are the result of decisions and ideas in the North and
thus reflect Northern calues and priorities.  The initiatives may not take
account of issues affecting developing country producers and developing
countries have rarely been involved.  Hence there is suspicion that the
schemes are more to do with protecting markets than protecting the
environment.  A case in point is the Dutch eco-label for cut flowers which
included the environmental costs of transport, thus favouring local
producers [has this been rectified?] (Verbruggen, 199?).  This imbalance
may have been rectified were southern producers included in the
discussions over criteria.  It has also been noted that some critieria on eco-
labelling schemes do not recognise differences in environmental absorptive
capacity and the importance of local factors for example: low limits for
sulphur dioxide emissions are not an issue for countries with dispersed
populations and no history of acid rain.
b) Knowledge and technical resources.  Involvement in many schemes
requires knowledge and technical resources to which many developing
countries producers lack access, for example there are no local standards
or recognised certification bodies.
c) Sovereignty.  Many nation states argue that they alone have the
responsibility for establishing environmental and social standards within
their own territory according to their own environmental attributes and
preferences.
d) Financial Resources.  Certification can be expensive.  Many producers
cannot afford the cost of auditors to verify that they meet the required
standards.  There is an argument that additional resources for groups that
might otherwise be excluded should accompany schemes.
e) Scientific basis. Some critics argue that the science underlying many
eco-labels are questionable in scientific terms or are subjective.  Indeed
many aspects of eco-labels are based on weightings and the FSC’s
principles are based on values rather than scientific criteria.  This is not to
say FSC criteria lack objectivity or rigour, but to emphasis the importance
of collecting a wide view of opinions in the establishment of standards.
f) Unilateralism.  There may be many different standards operating in
different countries.  An exporter selling to different markets may be
judged against many standards.  This can be costly and act as a barrier to
some markets.
To a certain extent these allegations of protectionism are based on
potential, usually unintended effects of some ethical trade schemes.
Indeed, little evidence has come to light to date to suggest that ethical
trade schemes are actually protectionist particularly in the forest sector:




labelling of forest products has not significantly
distorted trade patterns’ (Ruddell, et al 1999).
However the extent to which eco-labelling and forest certification create
impediements to trade may well change as less well-resourced groups try
to get involved in ethical trade schemes, as demanded by their markets.
We may not yet have encountered the real barriers to participation.
Despite its high profile and the rapid growth in certification, only 0.3% of
the world’s forest has been certified to date, to say nothing of non-timber
forest products (FAO, 1999: 91).  Nevertheless, the trade and eco-labelling
issue is alive in the WTO.
WTO rules and eco-labels
The legal position of eco-labels and forest certification schemes in terms of
trade law is unclear, hence the debate in CTE and CTBT.  This is for two
reasons.  WTO text dealing with environmental measures does not specify
eco-labels and so we must rely on interpretations.  Secondly, the WTO is
an agreement between sovereign states whilst many eco-labels are
private, voluntary initiatives.  WTO trade disciplines are either not
relevant for private sector initiatives or are less specific.  Moreover,
interpretations of the relevant parts of WTO rules are evolving over time
‘in response to an ongoing process of debate’ (Cosbey, 1997)
The relevant parts of the WTO for understanding the relationship between
trade and the environment in relation to eco-labels and forest certification
are Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) and Exceptions to the
Most Favoured Nation status and National Treatment Rules4 permitted
under GATT Article XX, clauses (b) and (g).
TBT
The TBT is a set of guidelines that specify the conditions under which
Members may place restrictions on imports or exports based on product
standards and technical regulations, and states the conditions under
which the standards and regulations may be applied.  It aims to ensure
that members extend the WTO principles of Most Favoured Nation and
National Treatment to technical regulations and standards from their
preparation to adoption.  Thus regulations and standards must not create
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 GATT Article I, ‘Most Favoured Nation’ states that all countries are equally ‘most favoured’; any
privilege or advantage granted to one member must be granted to all.  GATT Article III, ‘national
treatment’ prohibits measures that discriminate between domestic and foreign products that are ‘like’
products.  All imports must have no less favourable treatment than ‘like’ domestic goods (e.g. through
taxes, regulations, product standards).  Products are ‘like’ if they have similar product characteristic
and at the border they have no physical differences, regardless of the production or processing method




trade restrictions and the TBT aims to limit the use of technical
regulations and product standards to ‘legitimate health, safety, product
quality and environmental protection purposes’ (Ruddell et al, 1999).
There is no explicit reference to eco-labels in the text of the TBT, but in
the last few years debates about the trade restrictiveness of eco-labels and
their relationship to GATT/WTO trade rules have surfaced in the WTO’s
committee on TBT and also in the WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment.  Debates in these two committees have been going on in
parallel, though some documents and Member submissions have been
presented to both committees, as there some dispute as to whether eco-
labels are under the jurisdiction of the TBT or not.
A useful distinction between regulations and standards in the Tbt is that
regulations are at the level of government whereas standards are
voluntary and emanate from the private sector.  Those who argue that eco-
labels come under the TBT consider mandatory/ government eco-labels to
be ‘regulations’ and whereas voluntary schemes are considered
‘standards’.  Thus FSC would be regarded as a standard if it were covered
by the TBT.
‘Regulations’ must pass the MFN and NT tests regarding trade
restrictiveness, and must also not be ‘more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective’ such as health, safety or the
environment.  The term ‘no more trade restrictive than necessary’ can be
interpreted as ‘least trade restrictive’ and therefore members may object
to a measure if they could identify other ways of achieving the objective
(Cosbey, 1997).  The TBT also calls for regulations to be based on
internationally agreed standards except where standards available are
ineffective or inappropriate for the achievement of the objectives.  Hence
the TBT is supportive of internationally negotiated and agreed standards,
and hence the TBT recognises the legitimacy of the ISO Standards.  ISO
standards such as ISO 14000 are seen as consistent with WTO national
treatment principle because they are voluntary and they exclude
performance standards.
The rules are not quite so strict for ‘standards’. The code of good practice
does not require the standard to be ‘no more trade restrictive than
necessary’, but does require it to be non-discriminatory and not designed
to be an unnecessary obstacle to trade.  If voluntary eco-labels are
regarded as standards in the TBT sense, governments must ensure that
any standardising body/ or a government body administering the scheme
abides by the TBT ‘code of good practice’ and the government must urge
private or NGO bodies to comply with the Code (Caldwell, 1996).  Thus an
objection may be made in the WTO against forest certification if it were
considered trade restrictive and other methods of promoting sustainable




Permitted exceptions to trade rules
Another problem with problem with eco-labels under WTO rules is that
they distinguish between products on the basis of how they are produced as
well as their consumption effects, i.e. their use of LCA.  This is where the
permitted exceptions to MFN and NT under GATT Article XX(g) which
specifies conditions under which trade measures to protect human, animal
or plant life or health comes in.
The WTO does not allow Members to distinguish between goods on the
basis of how they are produced.  The interpretation of ‘like’ goods in the
National Treatment principle is based on the physical characteristics of the
goods.  Discrimination is not allowed on the basis of production and
processing methods (PPMs) where the PPM does not have an impact on the
performance of the product in consumption.  Recent analyses have
attempted to distinguish between product-related and non-product-related
PPMs (for example Caldwell, 1996).
•  Product-related PPMs
 Distinctions based on how a product is produced are allowed if different
methods have different impacts on consumption in terms of health or food
safety.  That is if thus environmental damage is associated with
consumption of the product (e.g. requirement for milk to be pasteurised in
a certain way for human consumption).
•  Non-product related PPMs
Distinctions based on how a product is produced where the process makes
no difference to the consumption of the product.  In this case
environmental damage is associated with the production process of the
product (e.g. emissions produced in the manufacture of steel).
It is argued that product-related PPMs are consistent with WTO trade
rules whereas there may be problems with non-product related PPMs.
Many environmentalists argue that the WTO should permit the
differentiation between products on the non-product related PPMs.
However, this position is opposed by most developing countries on the
grounds that this would open the door for ‘green protectionism’ and would
severely damage their trade.  Traditional trade economics supports this
view on the basis of the argument that PPMs should be decided on the
basis of an economy’s comparative advantage, including environmental
endowments, and environmental preferences.  To force a country to adopt
PPM standards developed elsewhere and not on the basis of international
agreement would lead to an inefficient, and potentially environmentally
damaging, allocation of resources.
The arguments around product-related and non-product-related PPMs




voluntary and are considered standards rather than regulations and
therefore are not subject to the NT test which forbids discrimination on
the basis of non-product related PPMs.
Some WTO members that support such ethical trade schemes are pushing
for clarification on the PPMs debate and the relationship between trade
and environment more generally and so there is likely to be debate on this
issue in the Seattle Round.  Whilst it is not definite that revision of the
TBT is on the agenda for Seattle, some issues relevant to the TBT may
come in via the back door of the eco-labelling debate.
The main areas of dispute are:
1. Whether forest certification should be regarded as a ‘standard’ in TBT
terms and therefore be subject to WTO disciplines..
2. Whether the scope of the TBT Agreement actually includes non-
product related PPMs
A number of observers have noted that there is no legal reason why WTO
block on processing discrimination cannot be rescinded.  For example,
Page notes that if the WTO has been able to expand the coverage from
goods to services and intellectual property, the definition of goods
according to process as opposed to physical description should not be
disallowed in legal terms (1998: 36).
However, the issue is extremely contentious and it will be necessary to
convince the many members who are opposed to movement on PPMs that
trade impediments will not increase as a result.  India for example made a
complaint against the Appellate Body’s ruling on the shrimp-turtle
dispute regarding PPMs on the ground that it would ‘open the floodgates
to unilateral measures aimed at discrimination based on processes and
production methods’ (Ruddell et al, 1999).   Other members opposed
members to the inclusion of non-product related PPMs include Korea,
Philippines/ ASEAN and Egypt (CTE minutes, 26-6-96).  In contrast the
EU and Norway and Switzerland are keen for clarification on the issues of
eco-labelling and PPMs (Bridges, June 1999 3 (5), p. 6).
Implications of WTO rule changes
It is still unclear whether forest certification and indeed eco-labels will be
directly affected by changes in the world trade rules.  However recent
debates and interpretations of trade law can give some clues to the likely
effects if:
a) the TBT is clarified to specify forest certification as a ‘standard’;
b) special rules are adopted for the design and implementation of
certification schemes;
c) there is no change.
 




(a) Forest certification is specified as a ‘standard’
If the scope of the Agreement on TBT is extended to forest certification
such that forest certification were treated as a standard, it would have to
pass the MFN test.  There would have to be measures to ensure that
private voluntary forest certification schemes were not discriminatory and
did not restrict trade.  However, as a standard forest certification would
not have to pass the NT test which has the added criteria of ‘ no more
trade restrictive than necessary’ and prohibits distinctions based on non-
product-related PPMs.  If governments decided to use forest certification
as a tool such that it became mandatory, in trade law it would be a
regulation and would have to meet the NT criteria.  So, if TBT were
extended to cover forest certification proposed bills to require government
contractors to use certified wood when working on publicly funded projects
would almost certainly be outlawed.
Looking more closely at the MFN and TBT requirements, voluntary,
private certification schemes would have to:
•  be non-discriminatory
•  be designed to meet environmental objectives
•  encourage harmonisation, or recognition of equivalence
•  use international standards where they exist
•  be verifiable
•  be transparent
•  have special treatment for developing countries
(adapted from Bass 1997a).
The WTO system recognises the ISO as a competent body for developing
international standards and its process approach, compared to the
performance standards of FSC, mean that it does not break WTO rules
regarding PPMs.  Therefore there would be greater pressure on FSC
schemes to conform.
The democratic international structure of FSC means that there would be
few problems regarding intentional discrimination or trade
restrictiveness.  Similarly the requirements for transparency and
verification should not be a problems.  However FSC standards may be
interpreted as being higher than necessary to meet domestic
environmental standards.  TBT calls for the use of international standards
where they exist and are locally feasible, which favours the ISO approach,
but more significantly it may mean pressures for FSC criteria and
indicators to be made less rigorous.  The free trade discipline of the WTO
leads to pressures for harmonised standards with regard to the
environment.  The WTO tends to prefer environmental issues to be dealt
with in a simple way that easily translates to the trade policy context, i.e.




but such solutions do not always exist.
Another problem with regard to TBT is FSC’s social standards which may
be not be permitted as the TBT deals with standards and regulations for
health, safety, product quality and environmental protection purposes.
The linking of labour and social standards to trade is not permitted under
the WTO on the basis of the argument that countries should be able to
benefits from their comparative advantage in cheap labour etc.
(b) Adoption of special rules for eco-labels and forest certification
Informal proposals have been made in the Committee on Trade and
Environment for the development of a set of guidelines for voluntary eco-
labelling schemes.  Most recently this has been proposed by Norway under
the heading ‘Rules of the Road’ [CTE 31-3-99].  [ xxx More detail to go in
here when the WTO search engine is working!]
This proposal is by no means generally accepted, but it is possible that
should eco-labels be debated it will emerge as a compromise solution to the
uncertainty that exists.  However the extension of such a set of rules by
the WTO to voluntary initiatives sector is problematic.  First it would
involve nation states imposing a legally-binding code on non-governmental
bodies and this to many observers would undermine the legitimacy of the
schemes and be an unpopular and controversial move on the part of
governments.  Second, as with the first scenario, the inclusion of forest
certification schemes under the auspices of WTO regulations could
threaten the survival of schemes. NGOs and other private bodies
implementing eco-labels would expose themselves potentially to legal
challenge if WTO Members countries considered that the code were
breached and trade barriers created.
The drafting of the guidelines would have to be incredibly careful in order
to avoid stretching or compressing of their meaning as so often happens in
a legalistic conflict setting.  As with other forms of law, the true meaning
of trade law only becomes apparent when interpreted in the context of
specific cases.
(c) No changes
One of the more likely scenarios is that nothing happens in terms of
clarifying the legal position of forest certification schemes, or at least for a
few years.  The current conflict over eco-labels fits into the third element
of Sampson’s framework for moving forward in the trade and environment
debate (1999).. The fact that most environmental labelling is process-
related and the opposition of many developing countries to permitting
PPMs-related criteria means that it is likely that in-depth discussion




clarification.  Change is only feasible in the context of a formal changes in
rules, usually only possible in comprehensive trade Rounds rather than on
the basis of consultation or collective approval
In the business as usual scenario it would prove difficult to get
international agreement and as such the present stalemate would
continue and trade law with respect to the environment would continue to
be decided on a case by case basis.  This is not satisfactory approach
because of its reliance on the identification of violations, complaints being
made and then the heavy cost of dispute settlement.  This conflictual
process may potentially weaken the dispute-settlement process and the
trade regime itself.  These points are elaborated by IISD, which is calling
for a WTO Agreement on the Environment as a long-term goal (1999).
[ a little more here XXX]
Analysis from a trade policy perspective offers no immediate answers to
the implications of the international trade policy environment for ethical
trade schemes in the forest sector.  Even if action is taken to eliminate the
uncertainty at Seattle, it is likely that things will remain as they are for
some time, with continued suspicions on the part of many Southern
countries with regard to the apparent protectionist motives of certification
schemes.
Equity approach5
However, one can look at this from another perspective, the equity
perspective.  There may be a case for a non-binding code of conduct or
procedural guidelines for non-governmental initiatives.  Such guidelines
would use equity concerns as a starting point and would ensure that any
eco-labelling initiative:
•  Takes into account the needs of the smallest producers;
•  Ensure that there is Southern participation in the development of
principles;
•  Contributes towards the establishment of local certifiers and other
measures to ensure that resource-poor producers are able to participate
in schemes.
These guidelines would be voluntary and non-binding.  In the best
scenario, private sector voluntary schemes would be instrumental in
drawing up such a code.  The application of voluntary guidelines might
reduce the chance conflict with WTO rules arising from the complaints
and disputes procedure, as they would demonstrate that the potential for
trade impediments had been kept to a minimum.
                                                





At this point in time, answering the question posed in the title of this
paper, whether the WTO will prevent the growth of ethical trade, is not an
easy task.  Whether the eco-label question is addressed during the Seattle
Round depends on the jockeying for position in setting the agenda for
these negotiations.  If change is on the cards, it will not be implemented
for some time to come.  In the meantime, however, there are clear
arguments for ensuring that eco-labelling schemes, and forest certification
schemes are restrict trade as little as possible both from a trade policy and
equity perspective.
[ xxx ideas to incorporate
•  mutual recognition of international national standards (Mutual
recognition may be the best approach where environmental problems
are local)
•  Developing Institutional Capacity: ensuring that local standards where
they exist and certification bodies which are recognised and respected
by corporations in the North.
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